Abstract. This paper proposes a hybrid two-horizon risk premium model with one-and twoperiod maturity debts, among which the risky asset and the riskless one depend on agents' investment horizon. A representative investor compares at each horizon the ex-ante premium offered by the market with the value they require to take a risky position, with the aim of choosing between a riskless and a risky strategy. Due to market frictions, the premium offered adjusts gradually to its required value determined by the portfolio choice theory. The required market risk premium is defined as a time-varying weighted average of the required 1-and 2-period horizon premia, where the weights represent the degree of preference of the market for each of the horizons. Our framework is more general than the standard model of the term structure of interest rates as in the latter approach, this weight is set equal to 1, implying that the 1-period rate is the riskless rate at any time and for all agents. Setting one period as three months, we use 3-month ahead expected values of the US 3-month Treasury Bill rate provided by Consensus Economics surveys to estimate our 3-and 6-month horizon risk premium model using the Kalman filter methodology. We find that both 1-and 2-period maturity rates represent in turn the riskless and the risky rates with a time-varying market preference for the former rate of about two-thirds. This result strongly rejects the standard model and shows the importance of taking into account the market preference for alternative horizons when describing risky strategies in interest rate term structure modelling.
2 choice model) or from an ad-hoc representation (constant or time-varying premium represented by an ARCH-in-mean model).
In fact, when the joint hypothesis mentioned above is rejected, it is not possible to conclude whether the rejection comes from the term structure relationship or from the hypotheses on expectations and risk premium. This is why, in order to solve these indeterminacies, some authors have used interest rate expectations provided by surveys among financial experts. Such survey data allow avoiding assumptions both on expectation formation and on the representation of the ex-ante risk premium required by experts. 1 Concerning the formation of interest rate expectations, using data from various surveys and from various countries and periods, authors found evidence against the unbiasedness of expectations and thus rejected the rational expectation hypothesis (REH) (Friedman, 1979 (Friedman, , 1980 Froot, 1989; Simon, 1989; Kim, 1997; MacDonald, 2000; Greer, 2003; Jongen and Veschoor, 2008; Prat and Uctum, 2010) . These results highlight the relevance of the question of how interest rate expectations are formed. About this, some studies have reported that each of the three traditional standard expectation rules -namely the extrapolative, the adaptive and the regressive rules -can partially explain interest rate expectations. Using survey data, Kane and Malkiel (1967) found support for extrapolative (bandwagon) and regressive expectations while Malkiel and Kane (1969) and Colletaz (1986) found evidence of adaptive expectations.
More recently, using Consensus Economics survey data, Uctum (2010, 2017) showed that experts form their forecasts by combining four limited-information-based rules: the three traditional extrapolative, adaptive and regressive rules and a forward-market rule.
The authors argue that such results are consistent with the economically rational expectations theory according to which information costs and agents' aversion to misestimating future interest rates determine the optimal amounts of information on which they base their expectations (Feige and Pearce, 1976) .
Overall, the mainstream results show that, whatever the maturity of the debt, interest rate expectations based on survey data are not rational and are well represented by a mixture of traditional rules, which make the ex-ante risk premium a more relevant concept than the expost premium based on the REH. Since survey data makes the expected change in the short term rate are directly known, the risk premium becomes observable, so that the term structure relationship can be tested by an appropriate modeling of the risk premium. Froot (1989) and MacDonald & Macmillan (1994) found that the risk premium is significantly time-varying and concluded that the term structure model based on the pure expectations theory should be rejected. 2 In this line, Artus (1990) and Prat and Uctum (2010) validate the term structure relationship in the 3-month maturity Eurofranc market by using a specific time-varying risk premium representation based on the portfolio choice model.
In the economic literature, the riskless interest rate is given by the yield of a debt security with a one-period maturity, while the rate of the risky asset is the yield of a debt security with a multiple period-maturity (absence of default risk is supposed). In fact, this hypothesis is arbitrary, because the riskless rate is in principle given by the debt security whose duration is equal to the investor's horizon. Consequently, while the riskless rate is
given by assets with one-period maturity for some investors (those whose horizon is one period), assets with n-period maturity (n>1) are considered as riskless assets for other investors (those whose horizon is n periods). With respect to this evidence, the main novelty of this paper is to account for this diversity in how investors define the riskless and risky rates through a hybrid model, in which we assume that, according to investors' preferred horizons in the market, debt securities with 1 and n period maturities can be held both as riskless assets and risky assets. Using three-month horizon expectations of the US three-month maturity Treasury Bills rate provided by Consensus Economics surveys (London) over the period November 1989 -May 2015, we estimate such a hybrid model of the term structure of interest rates where the rate of the riskless asset and the rate of the risky asset can both be represented by the 3-month and the 6-month maturity Bills. Because surveys reveal interest rate expectations, our approach will focus on the determination of the ex-ante risk premium required by the representative agent who invests simultaneously over the two horizons with the aim of maximizing their expected future real wealth. To our knowledge, such a hybrid model is novel in the literature.
In Section 2 we describe the theoretical foundations of the proposed model. Section 3 outlines the data used and stylized facts. Section 4 is devoted to the Kalman filter methodology employed to estimate our state-space model. In Section 5 we discuss the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The countries analyzed in the former study are the U.S., Germany, Japan and Australia, while the latter study exploits data from U.K. and uses individual survey data. MacDonald (2000) gives an overview of the related literature. is by definition equal to the difference between the  month-ahead expected return of the  n -maturity debt security (n is thus the ratio between the maturities of the long 3 Recall that a property of a zero-coupon instrument is that residual maturity equals duration. This is an interesting feature in that what matters in risk management strategies is duration and not maturity. For example, an investor with a given investment horizon takes no risk if their portfolio duration is equal to their horizon. 4 The price of a zero coupon debt security with maturity  n months equals the discounted value of future receipts, so that F is the nominal value, known at time t, which will be paid at maturity (interests plus repayment), and t n r  the interest rate (expressed in decimal-monthly basis) of the  nmonths debt security. Accordingly, and noting that the  n -month security at time t becomes a  ) 1 (  n -month security at time
, the expected return of the long term security between t and t+  is written as , and (b) purchasing the  month maturity debt in view of repeating the purchase in  months, given that the operation is risky since the price of the  -month asset at
is unknown at t. The  2 -month ahead expected total return for the speculative strategy
, which must be compared to the secure strategy (a) yielding The whole panel of investors consists of course in a multitude of agents i. We now describe the ex-ante market risk premium using the representative agent concept. The aggregate  and  2 -month debt securities market is then comprised of p investors, while the representative agent's expectation is given by the "consensus" of experts' beliefs provided by Consensus Economics' surveys, that is
. It hence follows from 6 the aggregation of each of the two individual risky strategies mentioned above that the ex-ante risk premia offered by the market to the representative agent for the  and  2 -month horizons can be written as
and
It can be straightforwardly seen that each premium can take any sign, that they both have the same absolute value but are of opposite signs, that is
To describe the decision making mechanisms for both horizons, it is now necessary to consider the values , they will be prompted to adopt a risky strategy (b) by purchasing the  -month risky asset with a view to 5 Note that such symmetry holds only when the ratio n between the long and the short-term maturities equals 2. 6 Since both observed and equilibrium values may take positive or negative values (for equilibrium values see section 2.2), the arbitrages described below apply whatever the sign of the premia. 7 The investor may have acquired the  2 -month asset by selling their holding of the  -month security, if any. Consequently, as long as inequalities between observed and required premia prevail, the investor's decisions trigger adjustments in interest rates, which help to restore equilibrium.
The required market risk premium
Since horizons  and  2 are considered at the same time for the determination of the market risk premium Mt  , the representative agent is supposed to make separately for each horizon a "mental accounting" 8 to assess the value of the equilibrium risk premium corresponding to the optimal portfolio composed by  -and  2 -month debt securities. These values are those required to adopt a risky behavior. Because the representative agent is an entity, regardless of whether they wish to invest at 3 or 6 months, the two mental accountings involve at time t the same total wealth, the same aggregate 3-month rate expectation, the same expected volatility and the same preference parameters. 
subject to the budget constraint
At t+ , investor's real wealth from the same portfolio composed at t is given by
Solving for (6) and (7) leads to approximate the argument of the expectation and the variance operators in (5) as follows 10 :
Reporting (8) into (5) ) (
represents the expected variance of the future interest rate,
the expected covariance between the future interest rate and upcoming inflation (defined as ) / log(
the share of the  2 -month asset in the portfolio. Eq. (9) provides the required value to which the observed  -month market premium given by (3) converges.
The  2 -month horizon investment strategy
The program of the representative agent is now:
subject to the same budget constraint (6) as above. The wealth at time t+2 is now defined
. A similar derivation as above leads to the following required value of the market risk premium:
10 To obtain expression (8) the following approximation has been used:
. For  =3, the empirical correlation between the two sides of this proxy is found to be 0.998, which makes the approximation admissible.
where we assumed that ) , (
11 Eq. (11) provides the required value to which the observed  2 -month premium given by (4) converges. It can be seen from Eqs. (10) and (11) that the values of the  and  2 -month required premia are not such that one is the opposite of the other, as are the observed premia (3) et (4). This is due to the fact that planning, at time t, to sell a  2 -month Bill at time   t ( -month horizon risky strategy) does not imply the same assessment of risk than planning, at time t, to buy a  -month Bill at time   t (  2 -month horizon risky strategy).
It can be seen from Eq. (9) that if the expected covariance between interest rate and inflation is positive, then the required premium
is positive. Conversely, if this covariance is negative, it suffices that the expected variance of interest rate be smaller than (or equal to) the absolute value of the covariance for the premium to be negative. For a  -month period investment, a negative required risk premium has the economic sense that the assessment of inflation risk adds up to interest rate risk, or in other words that the actual interest rate t r  is perceived as not compensating future inflation, which affects negatively the expected real wealth. In this case, the agent willing to invest for a  -month period might accept to pay a premium to purchase the  2 -month maturity debt security in view of selling it  months later. This strategy would allow the agent to reduce their loss, and even to expect profit if the price of the 6-month asset were to increase significantly to offset upcoming inflation. In the same manner, Eq.(11) suggests that according to the values of the variance and of the covariance, the required  2 -month premium can be of any sign.
The aggregate equilibrium risk premia
At the aggregate supply side, it follows from the symmetry between (3) and (4) that, at any time, representing one of the premia amounts to representing the opposite of the other one by using the same set of information. We can then express the ex-ante market premium using indistinguishably the same measure for the two horizons, provided that this measure can take 11 It seems indeed unlikely that agents might distinguish clearly between the two expected covariances, especially since the horizon of    t overlaps by 50% the one of
10 any sign. We arbitrarily choose to specify the ex-ante market premium using the  -month horizon measure, that we call the "two-horizon ex-ante premium offered by the market" and that we define as:
According to Eq. (12), a positive (negative) value of t M ,  means that the market premium is positive (negative) at the  -month horizon but negative (positive) at the  2 -month one.
At the aggregate demand side, the representative agent who reflects all investors in the market is concerned at any time by both horizons  and  2 , given that any investor must choose between a riskless and a risky strategy. Accordingly, the two-horizon required market
can be represented by a weighted average of
where t  stands for the weight granted by the representative agent to the  -month horizon in their required premium, thus measuring the agent's degree of preference for this horizon vis-à-vis risky strategies. Note that at any time t, the sign of the premium required by the market depends both on the signs of at any time the risk-free and the risky rates, respectively. This implies that the horizon of the market is assumed to be unchangingly  months; while in some cases this restrictive assumption may prove compatible with the term structure model, the restrictive hypothesis that t  equals 1 at each point in time was strongly rejected with our data. This is notably due to the fact that the required risk premium
-which can take positive or negative values depending on the covariance term -is not sufficient on its own to account for the alternating signs of the observed market risk premium t M ,  (see figure 1 ). This shortcoming of the literature can be overcome when our two-horizon required market premium is used to characterize the demand-side of the debt market. Accordingly, the equilibrium condition
leads to equalize the right hand sides of equations (12) and (13), hence
Regarding Eq. (14), it seems useful to discuss the limit cases when t  reaches the values 0 and 1. If t  =1, the market offers to the representative agent a premium that directly identifies with the  -month premium (3); at the equilibrium, Eq. (14) writes
. If now t  =0, then the market offers to the representative agent a premium which is given by the  2 -month premium (4); at the equilibrium we then have
However, given the symmetry between the observed market premia, the equilibrium condition (14) is still consistent with this limit case in the sense that any value of the required  2 -month premium generates the opposite value in the dependent
. For example, a  -month required premium of 1% implies an observed value of 1% when t  =1, while a  2 -month required premium of 1% produces an observed value of -1% when t  =0. The appropriateness of the two-horizon market premium in representing these extreme cases can be generalized to any value of the weighting coefficient t  . Reporting (9) and (11) in (13), the value of the two-horizon equilibrium risk premium characterizing the representative agent writes:
where t W is given by Eq.(6).
The adjustment of the observed market premium to its equilibrium value
When the deviation between observed and equilibrium market premia is zero, there are no arbitrage opportunities, but when ( ), agents can improve their utility by selling or buying Bills (see §2.1 above). A non-zero deviation can result from market frictions due to liquidity constraints, to search costs (especially asset selection costs in portfolio optimization) and to information costs related to the determination of the
As shown by Anderson (1997) for the US Treasury bill rate, transaction costs can also cause deviations between price and equilibrium value. Moreover, by influencing the market volatility, noise traders' behaviour may lead to mispricing the equilibrium value of an asset; this generates uncertainty about the true equilibrium value and then contributes to make arbitrage risky (Shleifer and Summers (1990) ). Consequently, both transaction costs and risky arbitrage make arbitrage unfeasible at some point and generate adjustment delays of market asset prices towards their equilibrium values (Jawadi and Prat (2012) 
Rearranging the terms, we get:
) ( (17) where
and where
 is given by Eq.(15).
Data and stylized facts

Observed and expected US Treasury Bills rates
Our study is concerned by the US Treasury Bills market. T-Bills are the most marketable debt and are a way for the U.S. government to raise money from the public. They are short-term securities whose maturities range from a few days to a maximum of 52-weeks, but common maturities are 1-, 3-, 6-and 12-months. T-Bills rates have many advantages.
First, a T-Bill is a simple zero-coupon debt: it is purchased for a price that is less than its face value, the government paying the holder the full par value when it matures; interest paid is thus the difference between the purchase price of the Bill and what the investor gets at 12 For a group of investors, the absolute deviation may exceed their arbitrage costs (defined as the sum of transaction costs plus a risky arbitrage premium), so that they will push forward a mean-reverting mechanism towards their equilibrium values. For other investors, arbitrage costs may be larger than absolute deviation. The larger the proportion of mean-reverting agents, the higher the strength of the market adjustment, implying nonlinearity in the adjustment process if the proportion of the two groups is time-varying. According to the linear Eq.(16) below, this proportion is supposed to be stable.
13
maturity. This implies that the duration equals the residual maturity; this is an important feature, since a riskless claim is a claim whose duration equals the horizon of the investment.
Second, T-Bills are affected by a very low default risk because the U.S. government guarantees to the investor a return on the invested capital. Third, income from Treasury bonds is generally exempt from state and local taxes (although they are subject to federal income taxes). and industrial companies (General Motors, Eaton Corporation…). The experts answer only when they think they have a good knowledge about the variable of interest, and this allows assuming that those who respond are informed agents. Since the individual answers are confidential (only the consensus is disclosed to the public, with a time lag) and since each individual is negligible within the consensus, it is difficult to claim that, for reasons which are inherent to speculative games, individuals might not reveal their « true » opinion. For all these reasons, one can reasonably assume that the expectations provided by the respondent experts are representative of market expectations. Considering the panel of experts, it can be noted that about half of the respondents remain unchanged over the period. The turnover in the other half can therefore lead to a bias due to a lack of homogeneity in the average responses over time. However, this bias can be considered as being negligible regarding the dispersion of the 13 CE provides also the expected value of t r 3 for a 12-month horizon over our period. Given the theoretical model described in section 2, our study only requires the 3-month ahead expected values. 14 opinions. Indeed, the coefficient of variation (i.e., at time t, the ratio of the standard-deviation of the responses to their mean) of experts' 3-month ahead interest rate forecasts fluctuates around an average of 0.067. This implies that the dispersion of individual expectations is limited enough (i.e. strongly lower than 1) to assume that no serious statistical problem arises from the aggregation of forecasts, so that the "consensus" values can be viewed as the representative agent's expectations.
The CE requires a very specific day for the answers. As a rule, this day is the same for all respondents.
14 Accordingly, we consider the 3-month and 6-month maturity interest rates 
r E
. Actual values of the 3-month bills rate are directly published in the CE bulletin while interest rates for the 6-month maturity is extracted from the Board of Governors of the US Federal reserve System at a daily frequency.
Stylized facts : the term spread, the expected change in interest rate and the risk premium
The term spread has classically two components that are the expected change in interest rate and the risk premium. Concerning our data, we have the identity Table 1 shows that the spread is equally correlated with the expected change and the risk premium, but that these two components are weakly correlated between each other. In other words, the risk premium represents more than half of the variability of the spread, which confirms the importance of modeling the premium to explain the term structure of interest rates.
14 This day is the first Monday of the month until March 1994, and the second Monday since April 1994, except the closed days (in this last case, the survey is dated at the following day). The effective horizons however always remain equal to 3 and 12 months. If, for instance, the answers are due on the 3rd of May (which was the case in May 1993), the future values are asked for August 3, 1993 (3 months ahead expectations) and for January 3, 1994 (12 months ahead expectations). The individual responses are then concentrated on the same day.  is not explained by a structural model, the term structure t t r r 3 6  remains also unexplained. ADF tests have shown that the spread and its two components are stationary at the 1% level of significance, while the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test indicated that they are all three highly autocorrelated (these test are not reported), which suggests the existence of deterministic factors. Especially, it can be seen that the risk premium fluctuates around zero (mean=-0.02) between a maximum of 1.06% per year and a minimum of -0.82% with a standard-error of 0.26%; the proportions of positive, negative and zero values are respectively 42%, 54% and 4%. In particular, the sharp rise of the premium observed in 1994 could be conditioned by the restrictive policy pursued by the Fed, which considered that the growth rate was too fast, implying a risk of overheating and therefore of inflation. The risk premium also exhibits a substantial increase during the Global financial crisis. The premium dampens during 2009 and remains around zero since then, which is likely due to the Fed's forward guidance of the short term interest rates by the Federal Reserve at the post-2008 period that led to lower the uncertainty in expectations and thus to shrink risk premium. over alternative windows of 1 to 9 month-widths, an unrestricted weighted average of the past values of the quadratic change in t r 3 , and an ARCH approach. The best adjustments of our structural model was obtained with the latter, the full specification being an AR (1) We now consider the representation of the expected covariance t Cov between the 3-month interest rate and upcoming inflation. The rolling covariance between the levels of the two variables calculated over alternative windows of 1 to 9 month-widths did not allow for good fits of the structural space-state model. We then computed the rolling covariance of the changes in the two variables 16 using a window width of k months (namely, t k Cov ) and took the weighted average of the actual and past values of these rolling covariance terms:
where the parameters k and
, were determined in the course of the estimation process of the risk premium model. Significant results were obtained using the specification (18) and optimal values were found for k=3 and i=2. Eq. (18) (15), we get the following equation of the two-horizon risk premium to be estimated :
The time-varying weight t  is an unobservable variable reflecting the degree of preference in the 3-month horizon relative to the 6-month horizon. We assume that t  follows an AR (1) process 19 .
18 To provide some insight to these results, note that the total amount at the market price of the outstanding Tbills can be written as ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( are constant does not alter significantly the risk premium equation aver our period. 19 Higher orders did not appear to better fit the data. We also attempted at introducing in the state equation changes in the expected values of inflation and of the GDP growth provided by the same surveys. All the variants were found to be insignificant. r r r .  ) and by the state equation (22) over the our sample period. We accounted for the overlapping bias resulting from the difference between our 3-months expectation horizon and the monthly frequency of observations by introducing a second order (horizon minus 1) moving average (MA) specification for the residuals (Hansen and Hodrick, 1980) . The coefficients q a of the q t z   20 terms were found to be insignificant and were removed from the final adjustment, while the coefficients of the two MA terms were found to be significant, implying that our estimates would have been biased if the overlapping problem was not accounted for. is a measure of goodness of fit which compares to a random walk with drift (Harvey, 1992 10.6, 12.6, 16.8) and (7.78, 9.49, 13. 3) at the (10%, 5%, 1%) levels of significance, respectively. The asymptotic critical values of the hH* statistic follow a 2  with 298/3=99 at the full sample and 221/3=74 d.o.f. at the subsample and are (118, 124, 136) and (85.5, 90.5, 100) which means that, at any time, both horizons play a role in the determination of the risk premium. Moreover, the limit values 0 and 1 stand outside the 95% confidence interval during almost all the period for the former and most of the period for the latter, implying that generally they cannot be statistically accepted. This innovative result contradicts the invariant hypothesis of the literature according to which t t   1  and consequently that the short term rate is the riskless rate. Further to our result that the weight is different from 1, we find that it significantly varies over time. This is seen from the evidence that, on the one hand, no constant value can unchangingly be included in the confidence intervals along the sample period. On the other hand, consistently with its non-stationary pattern, Table 2 . A Wald test of equality between estimates from this sub-period and those from the full sample has shown that the null of equality very strongly failed to be rejected at the 5% level, indicating that no significant bias has resulted from the zero-lower bound. , respectively (the data were provided by Consensus Economics). Other variables tested and which appeared to be insignificant were the uncertainty about future inflation (measured as the expected volatility estimated using a GARCH model), the degree of heterogeneity in interest rates expectations (standard errors of the 3-and 12-month ahead expected values of the three-month rate), the observed inflation rate, the observed real GDP growth rate and the 10-year maturity Treasury bonds yield (or its change) appeared to be insignificant whether lagged values are considered or not. We finally obtain the following regression (t values in brackets) : Expected variance of the US 3-month T-Bill rate Expected covariance betw een the US 3-month T-Bill rate and inflation
Estimating the state-space model
We now examine the ability of our space-state model to describe the risk premium dynamics. Figure 4 compares the "observed" values of the market ex-ante risk premium to the fitted values from the measurement equation (21): the major fluctuations are well reproduced and especially no systematic lags between observed and fitted values can be reported. We further checked the relevance of this fit using Harvey's (1992) 
Conclusion
This article aims at revisiting the standard model of the risk premium, which is a key component of the term structure of interest rates. We propose a new approach relaxing the commonly accepted joint hypothesis that the riskless debt is the one-period maturity claim, while the risky debt is the n-period maturity claim (n>1). This joint hypothesis is indeed valid only when the investor wishes to make a one-period investment. When the investor prefers to undertake a n-period investment, the riskless rate is the rate on a claim whose duration coincides with the investor's horizon (zero-coupon claims are considered in our study).
We consider a representative agent investing both at the 1-period and 2-period horizons and comparing for each horizon the ex-ante market premium with the required value so as to choose between a riskless investment and a risky investment. Setting one period as three months, we use 3-month ahead expected values of the US 3-month Treasury bill rate provided by Consensus Economics surveys and the 3-and 6-month Bill rates to estimate our 3-and 6-month horizon risk premium model over the period November 1989 -May 2015.
We find that the risk premium explains about half of the variance of the spread, which reflects the importance of modeling the risk premium to explain the term structure of interest rates.
Both the 3-and 6-month risk premia offered by the market can take positive or negative values but are strictly of opposite signs at any time. Due to this symmetry, we call the observed ex-ante premium offered by the market as the "two-horizon risk premium". At the demand side, we calculate the required (equilibrium) values of the 3-and 6-month premia as solutions of a portfolio choice model, according to which the representative agent maximizes the expected real value of their future wealth. Contrary to the premium offered, the required premia are not symmetrical although they can also be positive or negative. Because the investor considers at any time the two horizons, the required two-horizon premium is expressed as a weighted average of the 3-and 6-month required premia, where the timevarying weight associated with the 3-month (resp. 6-month) required premium measures the degree of preference of the market for the 3-month (resp. 6-month) horizon. Due to market frictions, the market premium tends to adjust towards its required value gradually. The novelty of our approach lies in the fact that, contrary to the standard hypothesis that the riskless debt is at any time and for all investors the short maturity claim (in this case, the weight associated with the 3-month required premium equals 1), this restriction appears as a limit case in our approach.
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We estimate this hybrid model with time varying weight using the Kalman filter methodology. Our results strongly invalidate the restrictive hypothesis of the literature that the riskless (risky) rate is always given by the 3-month (6-month) rate and support the evidence that, at any time, the market refers to the two maturities to define the riskless (risky) rate. The restriction of an unit value for the weight is indeed strongly rejected with our data, since the weight is found to vary around a mean of 0.65, which confirms that each of the 1-and 2-period maturity rates both represent the riskless and the risky rates with weights changing over time. Overall, our hybrid two-horizon model fits rather well the ex-ante market risk premium, which suggests that, to describe risky strategies, the market preference for a given horizon must enter in the modeling of the term structure of interest rates.
